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ABSTRACT 
Abstract:  The process  of debt—rescheduling  between  a creditor  and a sovereign 
(LDC)  debtor  is modeled  as a noncooperative  game built  on a one—sector  growth 
model.  The creditor's  threat  to impose  default  penalties  is ignored here as 
inherently  incredible;  instead,  the debtor's  motivation  for repayment  is to 
reap benefits from  attaining  an improved  credit  standing  in  international 
capital  markets.  The creditor  can forgive  portions  of the outstanding  debt. 
so that a real—time  bargaining  process  results  with concessions  being  in the 
form  of debt—service  payments  by the debtor  and debt forgiveness  by the 
creditor.  Subgame-'perfect equilibria  of the game are characterized:  the main 
finding  is that these all result in Pareto optima  in which the creditor 
extracts  all the surplus. 
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Any attempt to shed  light on  LDC—debt renegotiations  must  necessarily 
come to grips with the question of why sovereign nations repay any portion of 
their debts  in the first place  (or with  its counterpart of why banks ever 
choose  to lend to sovereign  nations).  Unlike in  the case of  domestic  lending, 
there is  usually little colla'  -'ral  available  in the form  of  seizable public 
assets held  outside  the country,  Nonetheless, lending to sovereign countries 
coexists along with  the historical  possibility of  widespread  default,  As 
explanations of this phenomenon,  it is sometimes argued  that countries say 
attempt to meet their debt obligations  in order to gain  future benefits,  such 
as improved  future access to  capital markets, or to avoid future penñties, 
such  as restricted  trade credi a and Imitations  on future lending  that debt 
repudiation  may entail.  10  this paper we  explore the strategic  ra,pitications 
of  the former explanation. 
The 'carrots—versus—sticks" division of  nations' motivations  to service 
and repay their debts,  while somewhat arbitrary  (since into which category any 
particular  measure falls depends on one's perception  of  the status  quo), has 
proven  to be a useful way of  organizing  thoughts about  the LDC—debt crisis, 
Eaton and  Gersowitz  (1981) examine  the borrowing  that can be sustained by  a 
country whose  income periodically  alternates between high  and low levels, 
Repudiation of the debt in  this model causes  the country  to be excluded from 
future borrowing  with  the consequence  that the country must use costlier 
methods  to reduce  fluctuations  in consumption  (such as stockpiling).  Sachs 
(1983) investigates a two—period  growth model where  the default penalty 
translates into  a fixed—proportion  reduction in the output  that can he 
produced  from any given inputs and exclusion from future borrowing. 
While most  work  on  sovereign  lending has recognized  that the set of  loans 
that a  bank expects will be fully repaid is more restricted than  the set of —2— 
loans  that are merely  feasible  for the debtor  to repay,  this expectational  (or 
strategic)  consideration  has usually been  incorporated  by requiring  that  the 
loan  made by the bsnk be such that the debtor  is at  least  as well off repaying 
its debt as repudiating  it.  Unless  this statement  is made in an explioirly 
strategic  environment,  however,  its significance  is questionable.  The 
knowledge,  common  to both parties,  that a country prefers  to  repay some 
portion of its debt to incurring  the costs of default  (or to foregoing  the 
benefits  associsced  with repayment)  and that the bank prefers  some repayment 
as opposed  to nothing merely  means  that a country may attempt  to bargain  with 
the bank to reduce  its total debt.  Why should  the bank  hold all the power  in 
this bargaining  game?  The amount  of  the loan that will  be repaid  in the 
game's  equilibrium,  the factors that influence the bargaining  outcome,  and the 
strategies  that  sustain  it must  be  explictly  determined. 
The existing  sovereign—debt  literature has,  for the most  part,  been 
content  to assume, often  implicitly,  that the threat of applying  the stick or 
withholding  the carrot  is completely  credible.  The consequences  of  departing 
from  the assumption  that  the bank  can somehow precommit  to imposing a penalty 
or  withholding  a  bonus  unless  the entire  debt  is  repaid, has been  examined 
previously  only  by Bulow and  Rogoff  (1986).  Making  use of  Rubinstein's  (1982) 
bargaining  model, they  study  the subgame—perfect  bargaining  equilibrium  that 
emerges as a consequence  of a country and  bank  negotiating  over how much of an 
exogenously  determined  debt shall be repaid.  In their model,  the country 
prefers to trade its domestically  produced good for a foreign  good, but,  if 
declared  in  default,  it is liable to having  a certain  percentage  of its trsded 
output  seized.  Their game possesses  a unique  subgame—perfect  bargaining —3— 
equilibrium  which  depends  on  the rates of  time preference  of both partces,  che 
gains from  trade, and the bank's  ability to impose costs  on the country's 
trade,  As in Rubinstein's  model, and unlike ours, ulow  and Rogoff  assume 
that no  economic  actions  take place  during  the periods of negotiation. 
Our paper  investigates  game—theoretic  model  of debt  renegotiation 
between a sovereign  debtor  and a creditor  in which  the motivation  for 
repayment  is only of the carrot  variety,  so that  any threatened  default 
penalties  are ignored as incredible  by both  parties.  'tore specifically,  we 
assume that  whenever  the (renegotiated>  debt is repaid  in full,  the former 
debtor  receives  a bonus  (in a generalized  sense), not paid  by the creditor, 
(The bonus  can be interpreted  as improved access  to international  capital 
markets.)  We are particularly  interested  in  exploring  debt  renegotiation  in 
a scenario  which  is able to  capture some  of the tension that  exists  between 
debt repayment  and LDCs' short—to—medium—term  growth  prospects  and living 
standards.  To this end the game is built  upon t  traditional  one—sector 
growth model, 
Our game begins  with the debt in place and growing according  to a given 
rate of interest.  There  is no link  to  any previous  time to explain how this 
debt  was incurred,  although  it and the resulting  game can be made consistent 
with  a larger  game  in which  there  is uncertainty  about  future  shocks  at the 
time the loan is made.  The game is one of  alternating  moves:  in each  period, 
the creditor  first decides how much,  if  any, of  the debt to forgive,  and the 
debtor then  makes  output—allocation  decisions for the period.  The country 
begins  the game  with  an exogenously  given capital stock.  At the beginning  of 
each period  production  takes place determining  the amount  of output available that period.  The country  then  decides how to allocate  its output  among 
investment,  consumption,  and debt service.  The greater  the debt  serviced,  rhe 
smaller the output  available  for consumption  and investment.  These decisions 
carried out, time  advances,  returns to investment  are realized,  interest 
accrues, and the moves are repeated.  The game ends whenever  the outstanding 
debt is repaid, whereupon  the country automatically  receives  the bonus;  If 
this never happens,  the game simply continues  indefinitely.  There  is no 
uncertainty  in the model,  and both  players are fully aware  of  everything  at 
all times. 
We study  the subgame—perfect  equilibria  of the game.  This equiiihrium 
concept  is the natural  refinement  of  Nash equilibrium  for extensive—form  games 
like ours  with  perfect  information.  It  possesses  the property  of ruling  out 
those threats which  an  agent would not be willing  to carry  out if called upon 
to do so.  We find that the behavior  produced  along  the equilibrium path  by 
the subgame—perfect  Nash  equilibria  of  our game is easy  to describe.  We now 
do so for one of them.  At the beginning  of  the game, the creditor  forgives 
exactly  the amount  of debt  that  makes  the debtor  just indifferent  between  two 
plans:  ignoring  the debt  and optimizing  in  the growth  model  on  the one hand, 
and,  on  the othsr,  proceeding  along the optimal  program  leading to ultimate 
repayment  assuming  no  further forgivenesses  will  be forthcoming.  The debtor 
then  follows  the optimal repayment  program,  and the creditor never  forgives 
any additional  debt.  (If at  the beginning  of the game  the optimal program 
leading  to full repayment  of  the debt yields  the debtor  greater utility  than 
the optimal program  ignoring the debt, the creditor  does  not forgive any 
portion  of the debt.)  Furthermore,  all other  subgame—perfect  equilibria  are —5— 
similar  in the sense  that all generate  the same  payoffs  as this one t  both 
parties.  We find this result  surprising:  it implies that the bank indeed 
possesses  all the bargaining  power  in the game,  though why this should  he so 
is not apparent  a priori. 
The rest  of the paper  i  organized  as  follows,  In  Section  2 the model  is 
presented  and the main  result  stated.  Section 3 is dedicated  to a proof  of 
the main result, and Section 4 examines  the issue of  uniqueness.  Section 5 
contains  remarks and conclusions, 
2.  The Model 
The game  G(K0,D0)  is played by two players:  the creditor,  naaed A, end 
the debtor,  B, over discrete  time periods 0,1,....  There  is a single 
commodity  (best  thought of as  creditor—country's  currency),  in the units  of 
which everything  is measured.  The debtor's  capital stock  at the beginning  of 
each  period  t is denoted  Kt, and the level of debt  at  the beginning  of each 
period  t is  denoted Dr.  Initial nonnegative values  for these variables,  K0 
and D0, are specified  exogenausly.  The game continues until  the first  time T 
at which  Dt  falls  to zero;  if  this never  occurs, T  .  At  the beginning  of 
each period  t￿r,  the output from  investing K  in production  is realized.  The 
first move at each  t (ST) then  belongs  to A, who selects  f, the part of  Dt to 
be forgiven  currently.  Next,  B,  knowing A's choice of  selects  current 
levels of  Consumption,  c, and debt—service  payment,  p.  Thus,  the following 
restrictions  on  the players'  moves  apply: 
0 ￿  and  Ct+pt ￿  g(K),  (2) —6— 
where g:R-R is the debtor's  production  functioo.  If p 
= Dt—ft,  the game 
ends; otherwise,  the next  period  is  entered with 
Kt±l  g(K)—tp and Dr+i  — (l+r)(D—p—f),  (3) 
where  r(>O)  is the interest rste on  the debt.  Both  players  are assumed  to 
know and remember  all past  moves  in  the game. 
The creditot  wishes  to maximize  the discounted  sum of  debtor's  payirours 
where  a is the creditor's  discount  factor; similarly,  the debtor 
wishes  to maximize 
to  fltu(ct) 
÷ flT+l1()  (4) 
where  $<l is the debtor's discount  factor, u is B's one—period  utility—from— 
consumption  function, and 1(K) gives  the value of the future to the debtor 
when ending  the game  with  no debt and capital stock K.  We assume  that Z:R-P. 
is increasing,  continuous,  and bounded below  by the function v, with 
Z(O)=v(O),  where v(K)  is the value  to  B of  following  the optimal  plan for the 
one—sector  growth model  defined by ,  g,  and u, with initial capital  starS V. 
(hereafter  GM(K)).  (If the game  never ends,  the last term in (4)  is 
identically  zero.)  We assume  that  u and g ste C2, increasing,  atrirtly— 
concave  functions with g'(O) —  and g'() — 0  (see  e.g.  Casa  (1965));  this 
insures  that  CM has a unique  solution for all initisl conditions  and that v is 
strictly  concave.  The game C(K0,D0)  is now completely  specified,  and its 
extensive  form is expressed  schematically  n  Figure  1,  Note that  C(K9,D0)  ia 
a gsme  of  perfect  information with  no  moves by nature. 
Let Nt denote  the set of  possible  partial histories  of play  h.  through 
the end of period  (t—l); i.e., H  0  and, for t ￿  1, —7— 
Hr  ((f0,c0,p0  f_l,c_l,pt_l):  (l)—(3), defined recursively,  hold, 
Let a and  b be any strategies  for A  and  B, respectively;  ie, 
a is a sequence  of functions  (a0,a1,..),  where,  for all t, a  selects  for 
each  htEH  an  between  zero  and the Dt determined  by  ht; and  b is a sequence 
of functions  (b0,b1, 
- .), whe,  for each  hcHt and feasible f, b  selects 
and Pt feasible  for g(K) and (Dr—ft).  The strategies  a and  b form  an 
eouilibriuin of  C(K0,D0)  if a unilateral  switch  to any other  strategy by either 
player  does  not yield that player  increased  utility.  As is well—known  by now, 
some of  the equilibria  in  games like C(K0,D0)  can be based  on implausible 
threats.  Subgame—perfection  is imposed to rule these equilibria  aut.  For 
t￿l,  any htEHt  generates  a new game GA(Ko,Do,ht)  initiated  by the M. and 
that result from  h.  Similarly,  a and b generate strategies  at and  bt for 
GA(KO,DO,ht)  as follows:  delete  the first  (t—l) component  functions  of  a and 
b, then  restrict  the domains of ar and br  for all rt  to begin  with h. 
Similarly,  for all t, ht followed by feasible  generates  another kind of 
subgame,  call it GB(Ko,Do,ht,ft)  in  which B moves  first after  the ir.Ltal 
condition  (Kt,Dt—ft)  determined  by h  and  Strategies  induced by a and b 
for GB(Ko,Do,ht,ft)  are defined  similarly  to those for GA(KQ,DO,ht).  The 
strategies  a and b form  a subame—perfect eui1ibrium of the game  G(K0,D0  if 
they  form an  equilibrium  of  G(K0,D0)  and, in  addition,  if they induce 
equilibria  on all subgames  CA(Ko,Do,ht)  generated  by  all htmH  and on all 
subganies  Gg(Ko,Do,ht,ft)  generated  by each  htEHt  followed by each feasible  f. 
Proposition:  If a—(l+r)  there  is a subgame—perfect  equilibrium  for G,V0,D0 
for any (K0,D0)￿O,  the play of  which  has the following  properties:  All debt— —8— 
forgiveness  (if any) occurs at time 0.  The debt (possibly  reduced)  together 
with  accrued  interest  is repaid at some T<.  The players'  utilities  at the 
equilibrium  play  ara Pareto—efficient,  with  the creditor  recaiviog  all the 
surplus over the debtor's maximin  payoff, which  is either v(K0)  or the rsximum 
of  v(K0)  and whatever  the debtor  can obtain  by repaying  all the original  debt 
with  appropriate  interest  in  the event that  this is a feasible  plan. 
Furthermore,  all other  subgame—perfect  equilibria  generate  the same payoffs as 
this one for both players. 
3.  Proof of  Proposition 
For each  K￿0.  let R(K)  denote  the set of debts 0>0 such  that eveotual 
repayment  of  0 plus  accrued  interest  is feasible starting  from (K,D),  ossumiog 
no future  forgivenesses,  and let P  — {(K,D): K￿0  and DcR(Kfl.  For coy 
(K,0)eW,  let w(K,D)  denote  the payoff  to  B from  rursuing  an  optimal  program to 
repay all of  0,  together with  appropriately  accrued  iotersst,  starting  from 
(K,D).  This growth—with—debt  model having  objective  function  w will  ho termed 
ODM(K,D), 
For every v￿0,  R(K)  is either  empty or an open  interval.  Throughout 
0, the function w exists,  increases  in  its first  argument,  and decreases 
continuously  in its second, 
fp: If  11—0 and g(0)—O, then  11(11)  is empty. Otherwise,  g(K)eR(K)  and if 
DeR(K), rhen (0,D)cR(K).  To see that sup(R(K))FR(K),  consider  the volo K 
such  that  g'(K)—(l±r).  Above  K, marginal  productivity  is less than (l±r), 
so that an efficient payback plmn  (with no  consumption) involves  using  onactly 
K  ma  input  to  production.  Hence,  if D￿g(K)K  and if 
then  B can  never  reduce  the debt after time  0.  On the other hand,  if —9— 
r(D—g(K)+R) < g(R)—R,  the debt  can  be reduced by an increaaing  amount  in 
each period  and hence  repaid; therefore  R(K) is open  when g(K)￿K.  If  g(K)<K 
efficiency  requires  using  all of K in production.  Under our aaaumptions, 
however,  after  finitely many iterations  (say r) of  this,  gT*l(K)K.  At this 
point, a teat  similar  to the one above applies, with the left side of the 
inequalities  replaced by r((l+r)TD_gTU(K)+R),  so that the same conclusion, 
that R(K)  is open, follows. 
To see that  w increases  with  K, it is sufficient  to notice  that the 
additional  units  of K can simply  be consumed  immediately,  then the optimai 
program for GDM(K,D)  followed  as before, resulting  in increased  utility. 
Similarly,  if  D is reduced,  the optimal program  for GDM(K,D)  together with 
additional  units  of K reinvested  each time and available  at T resolt  in 
increased  utility. 
For the existence  and continuity  properties,  first  fix any vsiues  for r 
and  K.  Now note that the set of feasible  (c0,p0  c,p) thot resuit  in 
repayment  by r is a compact—valued  continuous  correspondence  over K K,.  If 
repayment  occurs  at T<r,  set cT+l,pT+l  cr,pr  equal to  zero.  shoe  is 
continuous  when  viewed  as  a function  of (D0,c0,p0  °TI  'he rxi.s  e 
theorem  applies,  so that w  (w restricted  to programs  that repay by r  exists 
and is continuous  as a function  of  U.  As  above,  the set of  D's feasible  for 
is an  interval  (though closed  on the right now),  and w7 decreases  on this 
interval  to  the value 
u(O)toflt  4 
Now extend  w7 continuously  to all of  R(K)  in  steps: first  by setting  it  equal 
to  the expression  in (5) until  wr÷l  crosses this constant  from  above,  then —10— 
letting Wr track w1  (which eventually  tracks Wr+2 etcj thereafter. 
Finally,  w exists and is  continuous  (in its second  argument)  or. R(K)  since w 
is just the maximum  of  the 
Lemma  2:  If (K,D)tW,  let (PD) denote next period's  capital sod debt 
values, respectively,  when following  the optimal  (repayment)  prnerar!  for 
ODM(K,D)  and let K* he next  period's  capital when following  thc optical 
(nonrepaent)  program  for GM(K).  Then, w(0,0)—v(f)d,0  (w(K0--u(R));  and 
v(K*)_w)K*,D(l+rfl￿(v(K)_w(K,D)).  In  particular,  (t'/}/'  Indira 
w(K,D)kv(K);  and  v(F)>w(K.D)  implies v(K*)>w(K*.!)(lar)). 
Let c denote  optimal current conaumpti on  when  followira,  an onnimal 
program for  GDM(K,D).  Then  w(K,D)—v(K) ￿  u(r)+Bw(K,Dy  — (u(y  fhv(h)). 
Similarly for  the other case. 
Le&j  For all K￿O,  if  either DtR(K), or O'aR(K)  and w(K,0)<v(K),  then there 
is a unique  value f for f such  that w(K,D—f)—v(K). 
q:  If KO  and g(O)O, then  fD, since Z(0)—v(0).  Otherwise,  for g 
sufficiently  small,  SeR(K) and lim5,0w(K,5) ￿  u(c*)+BZ(K*)  x u(c*)tflv(K') 
v(K), where  c* and  K* are current consumption  and next—perion's  capital. 
respectively,  under  the optimal program  for GM(K) 
.  The  result  now follows 
from Lena  I and the fact  that infDER(K)w(KD)  (l—)u(0)  a 
We are now ready  to specify subgame—perfect—equilibriur  strategies  a and 
k for all possible  initial conditions.  For Player  A:  at each A—move,  if 
DR(K) or if  D€R(K) and w(K,D)<v(K),  set ff  defined hy  w(K,0—f)=v(K)  (ace 
Lemma  3); otherwise  set f—O.  For Player  B,  at each B—move  if v(K,0—f)<v(K), 
make  no payment  and proceed  according  to  the  (unique) optimal  program  for 
GM(K);  otherwise,  proceed  according  to any optimal program  for GDK(K,D—f). —11— 
From  Lemma  2,  ir is apparenr  rhat if f0 is zero an  for  all  'c 
optimal program  remains in the GDM regime; hence,  rhere  is at mo.t one 
forgiveness  along  che pisy  determined  by  ,,  and  that occurs  at time 
is also  clear  that at  the  debtor  receives  the payoff vK0), unl as 'a 
ran repay all of 03 with interest and do better man  v1K10)  thewny;  and 
creditor  card  ow,  ac  :suct  as pussibe  subj  at  to the con w'ali,t  rh  o'-  the 
debtor rereive  max(vtKgww(K5 Go)i. 
Lemma 4  The  strategies  a and a Latm an equiiorium for  any unr. 
initial values of K0 and 0. 
We must show that the respective  srratogiec  ate best  neserw': -  ann 
other.  Given  , Piayer A  can improve only if he can induce  s..  e e 
stream  wire present value  higher  than (D4—f)  (F defined,  as anew', aeet:sa 
to  00,K0), which  can only  be possible  if  f0<f and for some  t there is s "a 
other f' with the properties  that (l+r)tD0_f  > (l+r)t(Dp_f)  and thet after 
operating  according  to the optimal program  for GM(K0) for the first  t-l, 
periods,  B does at least as well ro  switch to  a repayment  strategy  at period  t 
after seeing  f'  But 
05u(r*)+pt+lv(K*1)  —v(K0)  w(K0,D0—f) ￿  Efl5u(c*)+fitw(Kt+l,(l4t)t(G  i_ta; 
a  *  r+l  *  t  *  t  - 
> E u(c)+fl  w(K1, (l+t) D0—f'); hence  w(K±1(l+t) D0—f')Cv  K, 
a comtradicrion.  Given  ,, Player B can gain  only if,  by  devisrinf,  a funnLe 
forgiveness  is induced which  leaves  B better  off,  This  is also esposstne, 
however,  since B is made indifferent  to some GM program after  a devLanl,  and 
the total payoff,  from  the deviation  on, cannot  exceed  what  B coald nave —12— 
obtained  by following  the optimal GM  program,  which  ia just  what is ganerarad 
by  and k.  I 
From  Lemma 4 we oan deduoe  that the equilibrium  (,k)  is also  subgame 
perfect,  The G—subgames are all instanoes of the game  0 with various  initial 
oonditions; but (d,k) forms  an  equilibrium  in  all suoh games.  While  the 
suhgames are not instanoes  of the game 0, the argument  that  tha strategias 
form  equilibria  for Ge—games  is exaotly  the same as in  Lemma 4, 
We oome finally to the payoff—uniqueness  issue.  Obsarva  that  at any 
subgame—perfect  equilibrium,  B r  tst receive a  payoff  of at least aax 
((v(0Lw(K0,Dfl)  in every  A—subgame,  where  (Kt,Dt) is determined  by 
since B has a strategy  that guarantees  this  payoff  regardless  of  A's strategy 
in  the subgame.  (Technically,  this is inaccurate,  sinoe A  osn foroe a 
repayment  earlier  than  planned  by  forgiving  all the debt.  Obviously,  curb  a 
move cannot  be part  of a subgame—perfeot  equilibrium,  however.)  Now, suppose 
that at some subgame—perfeot—equilibrium  strategy  combination  (a,b),  B 
reoeives more than  this  maximum  in  some A—subgame.  Let q=sup(w(K,D—f)—v(K)), 
where  the supremum  is taken over  all B—subgemes  which follow  immediately  aiter 
an f>O determined  by a, and where K and  D result  from the history  leading to 
the A—subgame.  Now q>O, sinte under  the strategy  combination  there is 
an  A—subgame  in which  A  forgives more under  than  under . 
jgmma  5:  Suppose  f, K, and D are such that (w(K,D—f)—v(K))>/3q at  the 
beginning  of some  B—subgeise.  Then, along  the equilibrium  path  of that 
subgame, B is  identical  to k and  makes no further forgivenesses. 
Proof:  If B imitates  k at the beginning  of the subgame,  then  at (R,Th, by 
Lemma 2, w(K,D)—v(K)>1'$q;  so a positive  forgiveness by A at the next move —13— 
contradicts  the definition  of  q.  If B continues  according  to h—h,  toe  ,e;e 
reasoning  leads to the same no—forgiveness  cooclusioo  On the thot  I  .O 
b  is not identical  to I, either h repays 0 immediately  (in which case b is 
inferior  to ), or B's payoff cannot  exceed  v(K)4-q  (from Lemma 2 and tOo 
definition of q)  which is loss  than B's worst  payoff  from  following h 
(another  contradiction) 
Now  select mv  A—auogase at which  srategy a  s"iacts f>s  0 c which 
w(K,D—f;—v(K)c'$q  rhere  must he at  least one soch  suhgame).  Let A  levim'e 
from  by reducing  f by an  aaount  snail cno'gh that  the last ioqumsity 
continues  to hold,  and then by fullowizg  a thereafter.  By Los,i  i,  U 
with no further forgivenasos; so the deviation  is Irofitablo, 
therefoco  m  hear response  t" b  in this suhgame  lois rontrodic 
establishes  that every  sung  me—pertect  equti:orium  generates  3 
as  (g,) is' every  subgame. 
4. About  UnThueness 
In this section, we indicate why, even  with  the additional  asse,,  2' 
that Z is smooth  and strictly concave, the uoiqueoess  ci tie  ogsu'ect' 
eqoilibrium  strategies,  as opposed to juct uuiqcenosa  of the cccssoxJ. 
payoffs,  is too  much  to expect without  stil'  mccc  strong 255efl2eeO5  Fielt 
a partial  example  to :llustrate  the posnt  that a' s suhgam wiere w e3,is 
it is posatole  rhat cc5  and pO  (with the obsious ootacio'' ,  tac 
forgiveness were required to oring shout  the  equality bataea,, a  a  I  ' 
delaying that  forgiveness  by  one period  (adjusting  for inte"est;  as '5 
difference  to either  player yet still  result  in a differunt  oqoiiriui. —14--. 
produce  this effect  consider  a utility  function that is neacly  linear, a 
production  function  that  is steep enough  (for small K) and a K small  enough 
that g'(g(Kfl>>l,  g'(g(Kfl>(l+r),  D>g(K), and Z(.)v(.).  The first 
inequality  guarantees  that  all consumption  will be postponed  under  v (and 
therefore  under w given the last condition),  and the second  and third 
inequalities  guarantee  that no payments will take place  in  the initial  peci.od 
under w. 
Next,  observe that  even  with  Z strictly concave,  there  is no reason  to 
expect w to be concave in  K; hence,  B may  have multiple  (subgame—perfect) 
equilibrium best responses  to  A's strategy g.  For a concrete  example  of this, 
it is easiest  if we first relax  some of the assumptions.  Suppose  D0=l, K4=5, 
r—.5,  and $.l.  Suppose u(c)_.l(l_et),  g(K)—2K, and 
ZK  5  10  + 180K  if Ks.5 
1  100  + u(K)  — u(S)  if K>.S. 
Now,  for every K, v(K) ￿  (l—fl1u(m)  1/9.  Also,  v(0)=u'(O)=.l, and 
Z'(O)=lSO.  Clearly,  Z(K)>v(K)  VK.  Repaying 0  at t=0, B receives  .1Z(4)=1. 
In  order to repay optimally  at time 1,  p0 must  be 0,  since  g'>(l+r).  Ii 
as well, B's payoff  is 
l0ax<5  (u(c1) 
+ .11(5—c1)) 
It is straightforward  to check  that the maximum is attained  at  01=0, with 
payoff  .OlZ(.5)—l.  Furthermore,  for any  coc[0,lJ,  the analogous  maximum  is 
<1.  Repaying  at time t￿2  generates  (u(co)+.lu(cl)+...+.1tu(ct)]+.ltZ(Kt+l) 
The expression  in  brackets  is no  larger than  1/9, while  the last term  is no 
larger  than .1001, the sum being  therefore less than  unity.  Hence k may  call 
for either c—0  or 1 at such  a  position  in  the game. —15— 
To  modify  the example  so that it satisfies  all our assumptions;  first 
replace  Z with an increasing,  strictly—concave  function that is zero at I<—0 
and 100 at  K—.5,  is very steep  initially, and has slope 180 at K—S.  Red'ce 
D0 slightly  so that Z(l—D0)'l0.  Now approximate  g by a C2—strictly—concave 
function  that agrees with  g at  K—.5,  satisfies g'(0)=  and g'()0,  and hs 
slope close  to 2 on the interval  ,5,l(.  Finally,  adjust  r so tt,at the 
product D0(l+r)  is as before. 
5. Remarks  and conclusions 
The driving  forces behind  our results, as in  other bargaining  models 
requiring  subgame—perfect  equilibria,  are difficult  to identify.  A possLhLe 
explanation  may  be thought to lie in the argument  that the debtor  cannot 
credibly  refuse to  repay  a debt if in  so doing it is not made aorse sif  tnr 
by  repudiating  it.  A symmetric  argument,  however,  should  then coneinc  Ce 
that  the bank must forgive  the entire  debt since, by  similar  reasoning,  the 
bank  cannot  credibly  refuse to  accept  repayment of any positive  amount,  If 
the situation  is likened to a  bilateral  monopoly  modeled as a noncoopetsti'Je 
game in which  a sole seller  (the creditor>  facea a sole buyer (the debter'  ard 
bargains  over the price  of a good (the bonus),  the outcome  is gener1y 
sensitive  to the particular  specifications  of the institutional  structure 
which  it is embedded.  As demonstrated  by Rubinstein  in a pure iterated 
bargaining  model,  the existence  of fixed bargaining  costs  per period  borne  oy 
each  player  yields  results on the division of the surplus that depend 
crucially  on  the relmtiva  magnitudes  of each  player's  respective  bargainind 
costs  and on the order of the opportunities  to  make offers,  when the —16— 
assumption of fixed costs  is replaced by fixed discount  factors,  the 
conclusions  as to the way in  which  the surplus  is divided  are different  and 
less  extreme,  but still give  a relative advantage  to the player  who moves 
first.  In  our model, on the other hand, where  economic  actions  take place 
alongside  the negotiations,  the order in  which  the players move is not 
particularly  important.  (If the order is reversed,  B's initial move  is 
determined  by v(K0)  and A grants  a forgiveness,  f,  such that 
w(K1,(l+r)(D0—f))=v(K1).)  It seems to be the real—time  nature  of  the 
bargaining  process  that  is at least partly  responsible for  the  extreme  nacurc. 
of our conclusions,  in  contrast with  Rubinstein's. 
The equilibrium  behavior  described  in Section  3  aeems, at first g1snnc. 
to be in conflict  with events  surrounding  the current  LDC—debt crisis,  s;hoco 
there have apparently  been  no forgivenesses.  It is possible,  however,  to 
interpret  the widespread  granting of  new loans, extended  to permit  countrios 
to keep interest payments  on the debt current,  as forgivenessea,  since the 
interest rates  on  the new loans  are often lower  than on the old.  The 
occurrence  of repeated rescheduling  of  debts, however,  most  probably  testifies 
to the fact that we have omitted some features  that  are important  in  the 
current crisis, especially  default penalties  and  uncertainty.  When 
incorporated  into  our model,  the latter could  account  for repeated 
rescheduling,  since uncertainty,  say, as to the productivity  of  next period's 
capital stock, might  create.  an  incentive  for the bank to reduce  the amount  of 
a forgiveness, with the intention of  readjusting  it upward  later  if need  he. 
Unlucky outcomes  stemming  from this uncertainty  at the same time provide an 
expanation  of the existence  of a debt too large  to be incentive—compatihle —17— 
with full repayment.  The role that  a default penalty might  play  is more 
complex.  The qualitative  differences between  a final declaration  of defaulc 
on a debt  and simply never  paying  over  an infinite horizon  bars  the 
possibility  of  adapting  our results in  a straightforward  way to a model vich 
default penalties,  Moreover,  the historical  evidence  on  default pen1:is 
appears mixed,  ranging  from countries  that have  suffered  invasion  and 
temporary  loss of  sovereignty  (e.g.  Egypt 1879 and Mexico  1859—61)  cc ochers 
that  have  suffered  no apparent  cost (see Lindert  and Morton  (1987)). 
The existence  of  multiple  subgame—perfect  equilibria  provides  yec ar.ccher 
avenue by  which  to reconcile  our results with  observed  reality  as  ir iic  iced 
in  Section 4.  If the debtor's moves  under both  v(K0)  and J(K0,D0—f)  coincide 
for some number of  periods  commencing  with the initial period.  forgiveneaaes 
(the present discounted  value  of  which must  equal  tne value  of f dececincd 
in  the initial period) may occur  at any one or a combination  of  c}.os 
thus permitting  negotiations  to extend beyond  one period. 
It is of interest to  speculate  on the roles  that various  of  our 
assumptions  play  in the analysis.  If  the creditor's  discount  factor  a were 
less than  both (l+r)  and ,  we  would  expect  the debtor  to be able to capture 
some  of the surplus,  since the creditor might  increase f beyond  I if  doing  so 
enabled  it to  receive debt  repayments  which possessed  a more favorable 
repayment  schedule.  The results  for other values of a seem less obvious 
Allowing  Z(O) to exceed  v(O) introduces  the possibility  that the country could 
attempt  "suicide"  (if, in  addition,  g(O)—O) by consuming  all its output;  thus 
credibly  committing  to no future  payments.  To forestall this,  a must be 
modified  to  require  I to satisfy  W(K,D—f)—max(v(K),u(g(K))+5Z(O));  otherwise —18— 
our results remain  unaffected  by this modification.  It should  be noted  in 
addition  that  the qualitative nature  of our results does not depend on the 
particular  version  of the growth  model  considered; variants  of it,  including 
an  extension  to a two—sector  model and the inclusion of international  trade, 
do  not alter our main findings.  Lastly, the assumption  of an  infinite  horizon 
is not crucial—our conclusions  can also be obtained  in a finite—horizon 
version of the game (in which a bonus  is received only if the debt is repaid 
by some  predetermined  period) as long as the debtor  cannot  avoid moving  leer. 
In addition  to uncertainty  and default penalties  as mentioned  earlicr 
inforrr  tional asymmetries,  free—rider problems  among the banks.  and the 
relationships  among  the creditor banks  and their governments  are other 
important  factors influencing  the outcome of  LDC—debt  negotiations  that  we 
have ignored.  It  seems possible  that future  research  on  their effects  could 
be undertaken  by  elaborating  on the basic  structure we have  utilized. D1g(K1) 
—19— 
(p0+a(D1—f1) ,u(c0)+u(c1)+2Z(g(K1)—c1—p 
FIGURE  1 
D0,g(K0) —20— 
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